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THE USE AND MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES 
 
Jonathan S. Masur† 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
As the number of nine- and ten-figure verdicts continues to increase 
it is impossible not to take notice: patents are becoming an ever bigger 
business with more and more wealth at stake. At the center of that business 
lie the damages that courts award at trial, and the ways in which courts go 
about calculating those damages. Yet the legal standards meant to govern 
patent damages are notoriously ambiguous and unhelpful. In the face of 
these difficulties, courts have sought a market mechanism that would aid 
them in calculating patent damages. The solution they have seized upon is 
to use existing licenses, typically granted by the plaintiff to third parties, as 
evidence of the proper measure of damages. But the use of existing licenses 
to measure reasonable royalty damages creates three significant and distinct 
problems: first, it relies upon private information available only to the 
parties to the pre-existing licensing agreement; second, it is ineluctably 
circular; and third, it creates incentives for the patent holder to distort the 
value of the licenses it negotiates in order to mislead the court. The Article 
describes and analyzes these three problems, and then turns to potential 
solutions. It analyzes a variety of possible reforms, including selection of 
particular licenses for comparison or the application of a multiplier to the 
value of existing licenses. Though several of these solutions show promise, 
none come close to being a complete answer. It may well be that courts 
have no choice but to largely ignore existing licenses when calculating 
patent damages, leaving them more at sea than ever. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, the three largest jury verdicts handed down anywhere in the 
United States came in patent cases. Carnegie Mellon won a $1.17 billion 
verdict against Marvell Technology Group for infringing integrated circuit 
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patents;1 Apple won a $1.05 billion judgment against Samsung for patents 
related to its smartphones and tablets;2 and Monsanto was awarded $1 
billion in a lawsuit against DuPont over patents on genetically modified 
soybeans.3 Five other firms won damages verdicts in excess of $100 
million.4 The following year, Pfizer avoided shattering the record for the 
largest patent verdict in history by settling claims against two generic drug 
manufacturers for $2.15 billion just as jury deliberations were about to 
begin.5 In between these headline-making numbers, dozens of plaintiffs 
won verdicts in the millions or tens of millions of dollars, and many more 
patent owners negotiated royalty agreements outside of litigation for 
millions more.6 After enough nine- and ten-figure verdicts it is impossible 
not to take notice: patents are becoming an ever larger business with more 
and more wealth at stake. At the center of that business lie the damages that 
                                                     
1 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582 (W.D. Pa. 
2013); Verdict and Settlement Summary, Carnegie Mellon University vs. Marvell 
Technology Group Ltd. & Marvell Semiconductor Inc., 2012 WL 8262739 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 
26, 2012) (No. 09-CV-00290). 
2 Verdict and Settlement Summary, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2012 WL 4078433 
(Aug. 24, 2012) (No. 11-CV-01846). 
3 Monsanto Awarded $1 Billion in Patent Infringement Case Against Dupont, 19 No. 8 
WJINTPROP 4 (Aug. 9, 2012); Verdict returned, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., (E.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2012) (No. 09-CV-00686). 
4 Verdict and Settlement Summary, VirnetX v. Cisco Sys., 2012 WL 7638169 (E.D. Tex. 
Nov. 6, 2012) (No. 10-CV-00417) ($368M); Jury Verdicts, General Electric Company v. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. and Mitsubishi Power Systems Americas, Inc., 2012 Jury 
Verdicts LEXIS 2875 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012) (No. 10-CV-00276) ($170M); Verdict and 
Settlement Summary, Mformation Technologies Inc. v. Research In Motion Limited, 2012 
WL 10864224 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012) (No. 08-CV-04990) ($147M); Jury Verdicts, 
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., 2012 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 
18042 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. 10-CV-03428) ($112M); Jury Verdicts, WesternGeco 
LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 2012 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 14042 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 
2012) (No. 09-CV-1827) ($106M). 
5 Teva, Sun Pharma to Pay $2.15 Billion to Settle Pfizer Patent Suit, 20 No. 5 
WJINTPROP 8 (Jun. 26, 2013) 
6 Verdict and Settlement Summary, Shelbyzyme LLC v. Genzyme Corp., 2012 WL 
5266437 (D. Del. Jul. 17, 2012) (No. 09-CV-00768) ($50M); Verdict and Settlement 
Summary, Enzo Biochem v. Applera Corp., 2012 WL 6951353 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2012) 
(No. 04-CV-00929) ($48.6M); Verdict and Settlement Summary, I/P Engine v. AOL Inc., 
2012 WL 10033892 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2012) (No. 11-CV-00512) ($30.5M); Verdict and 
Settlement Summary, Pacific Bioscience Labs. v. Nutra Luxe, 2012 WL 8628035 (W.D. 
Wa. Sept. 12, 2012) (No. 10-CV-00230) ($11.6M); Gene Quinn, Patent Business: Deals, 
Acquisitions & Licenses July 2012 (Jul. 20, 2012), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/07/20/patent-business-deals-acquisitions-licenses-july-
2012/id=26073/; Gene Quinn & Angel Krippner, Patent Deals, Licenses and Settlements – 
December 2012 (Dec. 30, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/12/30/patent-deals-
licenses-and-settlements-december-2012/id=30879/. 
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courts award at trial and the ways in which courts go about calculating those 
damages. 
Part of the explanation for the heightened focus on monetary 
damages in patent law is the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. 
MercExchange.7 That decision made it more difficult for prevailing patent 
plaintiffs to obtain injunctions.8 One of the primary benefits of granting an 
injunction was that it often freed the judge from having to calculate 
damages independently, leaving that determination to the parties.9 With 
injunctions becoming less common in cases where a patent holder prevails, 
the calculation of damages for patent liability has moved closer to center 
stage. The result is renewed attention to damages calculations, from both 
the courts10 and the scholarly literature.11 
Nonetheless, courts’ efforts to calculate patent damages continue to 
be plagued by a number of well-understood problems. In some instances, 
the plaintiff and defendant are both practicing entities that produce 
competing products.12 In these cases, the judge or jury has the 
                                                     
7 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
8 Id. Prior to eBay, there was a presumption in favor of granting an injunction to a 
prevailing plaintiff in a patent case. eBay held that the usual rules of equity applied and that 
courts might only grant an injunction when a four-factor test favored doing so—which was 
not always the case. 
9 Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (noting that an injunction 
clarifies the parties’ rights, allowing them to return to the bargaining table and negotiate 
privately). 
10 See, e.g., Apple v. Samsung, 2014 WL 549324 (denying Apple’s request for additur 
following a second trial on damages); Apple v. Samsung, 2014 WL 6687122 (setting 
ongoing royalty payments); Lucent v. Gateway, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re 
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 2013 WL 5593609; Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J.); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 
F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
11 See, e.g., John C. Jarosz, Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and 
Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769 
(2013); Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages 
Framework for Patent Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 
215 (2011); David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 
49 GA. L. REV. 79 (2014); Stephen J. Conroy et. al., The Case for Admitting Settlement 
License Agreements in A Reasonable Royalty Analysis, 46 LES NOUVELLES 291 (2011); 
Jaimeson Fedell, A Step in the Right Direction: Patent Damages and the Elimination of the 
Entire Market Value Rule, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1143 (2014); Layne S. Keele, Res"Q"Ing 
Patent Infringement Damages After Resqnet: The Dangers of Litigation Licenses As 
Evidence of A Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 205 (2012). 
12 See, e.g., Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“In patent 
infringement action in two-supplier market, lost profits damages may be in form of 
diverted sales, eroded prices or increased expenses”); Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. 
Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (substantial 
evidence existed for award of lost profits based on existence of two-supplier, high-end 
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comparatively easier task of determining damages by estimating lost profits: 
how many additional sales would the plaintiff have made had the defendant 
not infringed its patent?13 Of course, one uses the word “easier” advisedly; 
this task is far from simple. It can be tremendously difficult to determine 
how many sales a patent holder lost because of the infringement, or if it lost 
any at all. The patent may cover a feature that is largely irrelevant to 
consumer decisions, or it may duplicate an equally attractive non-infringing 
technology that the defendant could have employed instead. Thus, 
determining lost profits requires a court to answer a complex counter-
factual—how many units would the plaintiff have sold absent the 
infringement—without reliable access to much of the relevant information. 
Not surprisingly, the legal guidance provided by the courts of appeal—most 
notably the Panduit factors, after the case by the same name14—is 
notoriously ambiguous and unhelpful. 
However, in an increasing number of cases, the patent holder has no 
lost profits, cannot prove lost profits, or simply does not wish to attempt to 
do so.15 In those cases, the patent plaintiff will instead seek a “reasonable 
                                                                                                                                      
market.); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven though 
competitor attempted to suggest that the market included numerous other noninfringing 
alternatives to its device, patent owner provided evidence that no other non-infringing 
alternatives were acceptable during the necessary time periods.”); Mark A. Lemley, 
Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655 
(2009) ("Courts interpreting this provision have divided patent damages into two groups-
lost profits, available to patent owners who would have made sales in the absence of 
infringement, and reasonable royalties, a fallback remedy for everyone else."). 
13 See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“In 
determining the amount of damages to which King was entitled, the district court 
considered: (1) the number of lost sales; (2) the gross receipts King would have obtained 
from the lost sales had there been no infringement by Tapematic; (3) the cost of sales to be 
deducted from gross receipts; and (4) King's profit on the lost sales.”); Versata Software, 
Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Versata claimed this 
consisted of 93 lost sales, and it put forward evidence regarding demand, the absence of 
noninfringing alternatives, and the capacity to sell Pricer in this market.”); Micro Chem., 
Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To recover lost profits damages, 
patentee must show that “but for” infringement it reasonably would have made additional 
profits enjoyed by infringer.”). 
14 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978). The 
four Panduit factors are “(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable 
noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the 
demand, and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.” Id. at 1156. 
15 In some but hardly all cases, this will occur because the patent owner is a non-practicing 
entity that does not produce a product and thus has no profits to lose. See Christopher A. 
Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 
99 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee 
Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335 (2012). On other occasions, the 
patent owner might simply believe that it is advantageous to pursue a reasonable royalty 
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royalty,” which the court must determine.16 Calculating lost profits is by no 
means trivial, but it is substantially more determinate and straightforward 
than estimating a reasonable royalty.  To accomplish this latter task, a court 
must attempt to reconstruct a hypothetical negotiation between patent 
plaintiff and defendant—which likely never took place—and determine the 
amount of money for which the two parties would have agreed to settle.17 
Worse still, the legal guidance provided to courts and juries is 
almost comically counter-productive. When determining reasonable royalty 
damages, courts are instructed to consider the fifteen influential Georgia-
Pacific factors,18 a laundry list of considerations that shed little light on the 
appropriate dollar figures. The Federal Circuit has (correctly) struck down 
more determinate types of guidance, such as the “25% rule of thumb,” 
according to which 25% of the defendant’s profits should be paid to a patent 
defendant as a reasonable royalty.19 Similarly, it has (correctly) limited the 
number of situations in which a court is permitted to calculate damages 
using the “entire market value rule,” whereby a court would base a 
reasonable royalty on the full price of the product being sold, rather than the 
value of the particular patented component.20 But the result has been to 
leave courts almost entirely at sea and at the mercy of the parties’ experts 
when attempting to assess damages.21 In combination, the elimination of the 
25% rule and the limits placed on the entire market value rule have left 
courts guessing about both (1) the proper royalty rate, and (2) the sales 
figure (the “royalty base”) to which it should apply that royalty rate. It is not 
surprising, then, that courts have largely floundered when attempting to 
estimate reasonable royalties. 
                                                                                                                                      
instead. Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1661, 1676–77 (2010); see, 
e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
16 The Patent Act allows plaintiffs to select among the two options. 35 U.S.C. § 284; Omri 
Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2011). 
17 See infra Part I. 
18 These factors derive their name from Georgia-Pacific v. United States Plywood Corp., 
318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although Georgia-Pacific is merely a district court 
case, the Federal Circuit has adopted it as the touchstone for computing reasonable royalty 
damages. 
19 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
20 VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed Cir. 2014). Courts may use the 
entire market value rule only when “it can be shown that the patented feature drives the 
demand for an entire multi-component product . . . .” LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 67. 
21 For instance, it is much easier to price an entire product—which is being sold in the 
market—than a particular component of that product, which might never be sold on its own 
for market value. See Brian D. Coggio, Damage Control-What an Adjudged Infringer Can 
Do to Minimize the Resulting Damage, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 250, 296 (1987) (“However, the 
relative difficulty of establishing apportionment will operate in favor of the application of 
the entire market value rule.”). 
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In the face of these difficulties, it is natural for courts to seek an 
alternative means of estimating reasonable royalties. Again, one of the 
principal disadvantages of the turn away from injunctive relief as a patent 
remedy is that it robs courts of the opportunity to have the parties decide the 
value of a patent through arms-length bargaining. An alternative market 
mechanism that allows courts to use private valuations to accurately gauge 
patent damages would be of obvious value. The solution that courts have 
arrived at is to use existing licenses, typically granted by the plaintiff to 
third parties, as evidence of the proper measure of damages. A patent 
license offers the elusive holy grail: an arms-length transaction between two 
private parties that places a monetary value on the patent. Indeed, the 
measure of value provided by an existing license is the very first factor 
listed by Georgia-Pacific for use in calculating reasonable royalty 
damages.22 Courts have relied upon existing licenses in calculating damages 
for decades,23 and the practice has grown even more prominent in recent 
years.24 At first blush this approach makes sense; if the courts must 
reconstruct a hypothetical royalty negotiation, actual pre-existing royalty 
agreements might well constitute the best available evidence of the contours 
of such a negotiation. Not surprisingly, scholars, commentators, and courts 
nearly unanimously bless the use of existing licenses to calculate patent 
damages.25 
But the use of existing licenses to measure reasonable royalty 
damages creates three significant and distinct problems. The first is that it 
relies upon private information, available only to the parties to the first 
licensing agreement, about the plaintiff’s probability of success in litigation. 
Every agreement to license a patent is necessarily made in the shadow of 
the threat of litigation.26 If a patent holder had no means to enforce its 
                                                     
22 Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (“1. The royalties received by the patentee 
for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.”). 
23 Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
24 See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc., 767 F.3d at 1330–31; Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed Cir. 2012) (validating the 
use of some licenses in determining damages and rejecting others); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure 
Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1212 (Fed.Cir.2010); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 
773 F.3d 1201; Waterton Polymer Products USA, LLC v. EdiZONE, LLC, 2014 WL 
5782710 (D. Utah 2014); Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc'ns, Inc., No. 13-CV-346-BBC, 
2014 WL 5080411 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 9, 2014); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 
899 F. Supp. 2d 971 (S.D. Cal. 2012); ReedHycalog, UK, Ltd. v. Diamond Innovations 
Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Tex. 2010); Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 
CIV.A. 2:06-CV-72 DF, 2010 WL 903259, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2010); Spreadsheet 
Automation Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 587 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Tex. 2007). 
25 See sources cited in supra note 11. 
26 See infra Part II.A. 
 
 
17-June-15 MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES 7 
 
 
patent, no licensee would pay royalties for a license. Accordingly, any 
negotiation over royalties will necessarily be based upon the outcome the 
parties expected should the case go to trial.27 The parties will have to 
account for the possibility that courts will find the patent invalid or not 
infringed—the possibility, that is, that the licensee will not be forced to pay 
anything. 
This highlights the second, closely related problem with using 
existing licenses to calculate reasonable royalty damages: the procedure is 
ineluctably circular.28 Licensing agreements are based upon expected 
damages awards at trial. But if damages awarded at trial are in turn based 
upon licensing agreements, it creates an unconquerable chicken-and-egg 
problem. Judicial error with regard to the appropriate measure of damages 
will produce smaller royalty amounts outside of litigation, which will in 
turn lead to lower judicial calculations of damages, which will then beget 
even smaller royalty payments outside of litigation, and so forth. 
The third problem stemming from the use of existing licenses is 
common to any setting in which a contract between two parties, A and B, 
will affect the rights of a third party, C. A and B will always have an 
incentive to distort their contract so as to maximize their joint gains against 
C.29  For instance, suppose that a patent owner P understands that the 
licensing agreement it reaches with a licensee L1 will affect the damages it 
obtains in litigation against a second subsequent licensee, L2, or the royalty 
it can negotiate with a third subsequent licensee, L3. P has a strong incentive 
to inflate the value of its agreement with L1, perhaps in exchange for 
providing L1 with something else of value. Courts have to be vigilant in 
policing licensing agreements for extraneous considerations before using 
those agreements to estimate damages. At the same time, if courts are too 
particular in requiring that an agreement include nothing but a license to use 
a patented technology, they may find few existing licenses that can serve as 
sound bases for calculating damages. 
In light of these problems, the question is what role existing licenses 
should play in judicial damages calculations. It would seem counter-
productive to throw away information about patent valuations when such 
information is so scarce to begin with. But without some means of 
accounting for the context within which parties negotiate licenses, there is 
doubt as to whether existing licenses can provide reliable evidence of 
                                                     
27 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1992, 1993 (2007); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. 
& ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and 
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); see also John P. Gould, The 
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973). 
28 See infra Part II.B. 
29 See infra Part II.C. 
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reasonable royalty damages. The final Part considers a variety of potential 
solutions to these problems. Though several of these solutions show 
promise, none comes close to being a complete answer. It may well be that 
courts have no choice but to treat existing licenses as providing only the 
most limited of guidance when calculating damages at trial. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the courts’ 
practice of using existing licenses to gauge reasonable royalty patent 
damages and outlines the rules that courts have developed to guide that 
practice. Part II analyzes the three problems inherent to using existing 
licenses to calculate reasonable royalties: courts’ inability to access the 
private information that will unlock the license; the circularity involved in 
relying upon existing licenses in damages calculations; and the incentives to 
distort contracts when a contract between two parties is used to value 
property or legal rights in a manner that affects a third party. Part III 
considers a variety of potential mechanisms for solving these problems but 
concludes that the difficulties they create cannot be entirely ameliorated. 
The Article closes with an inquiry into whether there remains any viable 
role for existing licenses in the setting of reasonable royalty damages at 
trial. 
 
 
I. LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND REASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES 
 
When a patent plaintiff prevails at trial but cannot prove lost profits 
or damages—or does not wish to try—the adjudicating court must instead 
determine the reasonable royalty that an infringer should have paid the 
patent holder to license the patent.30 The court must imagine a hypothetical 
negotiation between the plaintiff and the defendant, conducted at the 
moment before the defendant’s infringement began,31 and determine the 
royalty the two parties would have settled upon after bargaining at arm’s 
length. The court must further assume, for purposes of this hypothetical 
negotiation, that both parties know the patent to be valid and infringed—as 
the court has just found it to be.32 This inquiry is both hypothetical and well 
                                                     
30 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant 
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty . . . .”). 
31 See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 
(Fed.Cir.2006) ( “[T]he hypothetical negotiation relates to the date of first infringement.”); 
State Indus., Inc. v. Mor–Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“The 
determination of a reasonable royalty . . . [is based] on what a willing licensor and licensee 
would bargain for at hypothetical negotiations on the date infringement started.”). 
32 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1301; see also Paul M. Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent 
Damages, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691, 722–23 (1993). 
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after the fact, and it requires the court to forget many facts that it has 
learned and imagine many others that it cannot know.33 It is naturally 
fraught with both error and complication.34 The Federal Circuit35 has 
compounded the situation by providing only amorphous guidance to the 
lower courts. Courts awarding a reasonable royalty are instructed to apply 
the fifteen-part test enumerated in Georgia Pacific.36 Almost needless to 
say, lower courts have found this to be anything but a straightforward 
task.37 
It is thus not surprising that courts have grasped for sources of 
market information, believing them superior to the court’s own speculation 
and hypothesizing. Georgia-Pacific itself encourages this; the very first 
Georgia-Pacific factor is “[t]he royalties received by the patentee for the 
licensing of the patent in suit,”38 and the second is “the rates paid by the 
licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.”39 
Existing licenses—whether granted by the plaintiff for access to the patent 
technology, or purchased by the defendant for similar technologies—are 
thus front and center in reasonable royalty calculations. 
But this does not mean that all licenses are treated equally. Federal 
courts have evolved a set of rules to determine whether an existing license 
will be admitted into evidence and, if admitted, what weight it will be 
afforded.40 First and foremost is the sensible rule that the existing license in 
                                                     
33 The difficulties that courts encounter in trying to reconstruct this hypothetical negotiation 
are further detailed in Parts II and III. 
34 See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Determining 
a fair and reasonable royalty is often . . . a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to involve 
more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.”); see also Merritt J. Hasbrouck, 
Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages Framework for Patent 
Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 193 (2011) (“Although 
the courts have made some progress in other areas of patent law, one troublesome area 
remains: the appropriate standard for determining a reasonable royalty damages amount.”). 
35 The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction from final decisions of district 
courts in the area of patent law. 28 U.S.C § 1295(a).  
36 Georgia-Pacific v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
37 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“This 
is a formidable list . . . . And could a judge or a jury really balance 15 or more factors and 
come up with anything resembling an objective assessment?”); see also Bo Zeng, Lucent v. 
Gateway: Putting the "Reasonable" Back into Reasonable Royalties, 26 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 329, 333 (2011) (“In essence, Georgia-Pacific's hypothetical, individually-negotiated 
approach complicated reasonable royalty determinations . . . .”). 
38 Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
39 Id. 
40 See Zelin Yang, Damaging Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable Royalty Damages, 
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 668–69 (2014) (“Although reasonable arguments could be 
made for each of these factors to be the starting point in determining a royalty rate, the 
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question must involve a patent very similar (if not identical) to the patent in 
suit.41 A comparison is not valuable if it is not apples-to-apples, or close to 
it. Thus, existing licenses that bundle together multiple patents, or a patent 
and something else of value (such as a trademark or trade secret), are 
typically not accepted as valid comparisons.42 Similarly, courts disfavor 
licenses for unrelated technology, on the theory that they may be more or 
less valuable than the technology in the patent at suit.43 In addition, courts 
generally frown upon the use of one type of license—for instance, a lump 
sum license—to calculate a different type of license, such as a running 
royalty in which the defendant pays per unit sold over time.44 In practice, 
this means that licenses granted by the patent owner for the same patent are 
more commonly used in calculating damages than licenses taken by the 
defendant on similar technologies.45 
                                                                                                                                      
Federal Circuit has increased the level of scrutiny in assessing whether licenses are truly 
‘comparable.’”). 
41 See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“damages award cannot stand solely on evidence which amounts to little more than a 
recitation of royalty numbers . . . particularly when it is doubtful that the technology of 
those license agreements is in any way similar to the technology being litigated here.”); see 
also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 79 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“When relying on licenses to prove a reasonable royalty, alleging a loose or vague 
comparability between different technologies or licenses does not suffice . . . . We insisted 
that the ‘licenses relied upon by the patentee in proving damages [be] sufficiently 
comparable to the hypothetical license at issue in suit.’”) (quoting Lucent Technologies, 
Inc., 580 F.3d at 1325). 
42 See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In sum, the 
district court erred by considering ResQNet's re-bundling licenses to significantly adjust 
upward the reasonable royalty without any factual findings that accounted for the 
technological and economic differences between those licenses and the ′075 patent.”); see 
also John Elmore, The Technological Comparability of Patent License Agreements, 46 LES 
NOUVELLES 115, 116 (2011) (“[C]ase law cautions that patent license agreements 
providing substantial non-patent benefits or multiple patents may not be comparable to a 
“straight” patent license.”). 
43 See ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 869 (“This court has long required district courts 
performing reasonable royalty calculations to exercise vigilance when considering past 
licenses to technologies other than the patent in suit . . . . Any evidence unrelated to the 
claimed invention does not support compensation for infringement but punishes beyond the 
reach of the statute.”); see also Zeng, supra note 37, at 356 (“The Federal Circuit has 
eliminated unrelated past licenses from consideration in patent damage analyses and should 
do so because every licensing agreement is unique.”). 
44 See, e.g., ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 807 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
45 See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent 
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 748 (2011) 
(“Strictly speaking, then, for a license to be economically comparable it should relate to the 
same patent or patents at issue”); Roy Weinstein et. al., Taming Complex Intellectual 
Property Compensation Problems, 22 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 547, 553 (2013) (“In view of 
ResQNet and Lucent, comparable licenses can only include licenses to the patent-in-suit 
 
 
17-June-15 MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES 11 
 
 
Second, and more important for present purposes, courts46 and 
commentators47 generally disfavor licenses that parties negotiated as 
settlements to ongoing litigation. Courts have reasoned that litigation 
distorts the licensing prices that defendants are willing to pay, skewing 
prices upward.48 According to these courts, the primary cause of this 
distortion is the cost of litigating: in order to avoid litigation costs, patent 
defendants might be willing to pay more than they otherwise would to settle 
a dispute and license a patent.49 For many years, courts flatly refused to 
consider any settlement under threat of litigation as reliable evidence of a 
patent’s value,50 or at minimum the courts greatly discounted the probative 
value of such a license.51 Those types of settlements were often barred from 
                                                                                                                                      
itself, essentially removing from consideration licenses contemplated under Georgia-
Pacific Factors 2 and 12.”). 
46 See, e.g., Tights, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 442 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1977). 
47 See, e.g., Keele, supra note 11, at 216 (arguing that licenses negotiated during litigation 
settlement are highly prejudicial and rarely probative); Tejas N. Narechania & Jackson 
Taylor Kirklin, An Unsettling Development: The Use of Settlement-Related Evidence for 
Damages Determinations in Patent Litigation, 2012 J. LAW, TECH & POL’Y 1 (2012) 
(arguing that courts should bar all evidence related to settlement of litigation disputes). A 
few scholars have argued that licenses negotiated as settlements to litigation should be 
allowed into evidence when assessing damages, though this remains a minority viewpoint. 
See Conroy et al., supra note 11; Michael Chapman, Using Settlement Licenses in 
Reasonable Royalty Determinations, 49 IDEA: The Intellectual Property Law Review 313 
(2009). 
48 Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 
1354, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“[P]eople may settle patent litigation to reduce the costs of the 
legal process. The terms of a settlement reflect these costs as well as the parties' estimates 
about the probable outcome on the merits if the case proceeds . . . .”); Keele, supra note 11, 
at 205–06 (noting the effect of litigation costs on settlement value). 
49 Lumen View Tech., LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 24 F. Supp.3d 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 30, 2014) (“Lumen's motivation in this litigation was to extract a nuisance settlement 
from FTB on the theory that FTB would rather pay an unjustified license fee than bear the 
costs of the threatened expensive litigation.”); Steering Committee Report, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
811, 823 (1989) (“[T]he threat of unreimbursable litigation costs can give weak claims a 
nuisance settlement value they do not deserve.”); J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and 
Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 388, 397 (2006) (“Patent trolls typically demand 
licenses that are significantly less than the expected cost that each target company will 
incur in litigation. Thus, many target companies opt for the economically efficient path and 
pay a license fee to the patent troll rather than incur litigation costs.”). 
50 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408; Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 164 (1889) (“[A] payment 
of any sum in settlement of a claim for an alleged infringement cannot be taken as a 
standard to measure the value of the improvements patented, in determining the damages 
sustained by the owners of the patent in other cases of infringement.”); PATENT LAW 
DAMAGES & PRACTICE § 3.17 (2014). 
51 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“[A]s the White license was negotiated against a backdrop of continuing litigation and [the 
defendant's] infringement of the Schreiner patent, the district court could properly discount 
the probative value of the White license with regard to a reasonable royalty.”). 
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evidence. However, in the 2010 case ResQNet v. Lansa,52 the Federal 
Circuit appeared to invite consideration of licenses negotiated as settlements 
to litigation, though they would be awarded less evidentiary weight.53 Since 
2010, courts have occasionally considered licenses negotiated during 
litigation as indicators of patent value.54 By and large, however, courts have 
continued to express a strong preference for licenses negotiated “in the 
wild”—outside of litigation.55 These licenses form the bulk of sources to 
which courts have turned for guidance in setting reasonable royalty 
damages.56 
LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer provides an illustrative 
example.57 There, the parties introduced into evidence twenty-nine prior 
licenses of the patent in suit.58 On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the 
“vast majority” of these twenty-nine licenses had been negotiated outside of 
litigation, and that those licenses provided the most reliable evidence of the 
true value of the patent.59 The court then singled out for disapprobation a 
license negotiated by a firm named BenQ that had arisen under unusual 
circumstances: 
 
This settlement agreement was executed within two weeks of the 
anticipated trial against BenQ. . . . By the time of the settlement, 
BenQ had been repeatedly sanctioned by the district court for 
discovery misconduct and misrepresentation. The district court had 
                                                     
52 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
53 Id. at 870–71. 
54 E.g., Volumetrics Med. Imaging, LLC v. Toshiba Am. Med. Sys., Inc., No. 1:05CV955, 
2011 WL 2470460, at *14 (M.D.N.C. June 20, 2011); Small v. Nobel Biocare USA, LLC, 
808 F. Supp. 2d 584, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Automated Merch. Sys. Inc. v. Crane Co., 279 
F.R.D. 366, 373 (N.D. W. Va. 2011). 
55 E.g., Ravo v. Covidien LP, No. CIV.A. 11-1637, 2014 WL 5439787, at *7 (W.D. Pa. 
Oct. 24, 2014) (“Settlement agreements are generally not relevant ‘because in the usual 
course they do not provide an accurate reflection of what a willing licensor would do in an 
arm's length transaction.’”) (citing LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer, 694 F.3d 51, 77–
78 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13-CIV-23309, 2014 WL 
5741870, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2014) (refusing to consider a license negotiated during 
litigation); Sentius Int'l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-CV-00825-PSG, 2015 WL 
451950, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (same). Commentators, even those who have 
advocated giving non-zero weight to litigation settlements, have expressed similar 
preferences for non-litigation licenses. See Conroy et al., supra note 11, at 302 (suggesting 
that licenses negotiated as settlements to litigation should be admitted but arguing that they 
are less probative than licenses negotiated outside of litigation); Taylor, supra note 11, at 
114 (same); Keele, supra note 11, at 207 (same). 
56 Yang, supra note 40, at 669.  
57 694 F.3d 51 (2012). 
58 Id. at 78. 
59 Id. 
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allotted BenQ one-third less time than [the patent owner] for voir 
dire, opening statement, and closing argument, had awarded 
attorneys' fees to [the patent owner] for bringing the sanctions 
motion, had stricken one of BenQ's pleaded defenses, and had 
sanctioned BenQ $500,000.00 as an additional punitive and 
deterrent measure.60 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, BenQ agreed to license the patent for a great deal 
more money than any of the other licensees. BenQ paid $6 million, while 
none of the other licenses exceeded $1 million.61 The Federal Circuit held 
that the district court had abused its discretion in admitting the BenQ 
license into evidence.62 It declared that the “unique coercive circumstances” 
surrounding this license made it a particularly unreliable gauge of the 
patent’s value.63  
There can be little doubt that BenQ’s setbacks in its litigation 
against LaserDynamics (the patent owner) contributed to its larger licensing 
figure. Had BenQ not been embroiled in litigation against LaserDynamics, 
and had it not been faring so poorly, it would very likely have settled for 
much less—probably $1 million or less, in line with the other licensees. 
Nonetheless, I wish to suggest that the Federal Circuit had it exactly 
backwards: the BenQ license, and not the other twenty-eight licenses, was 
the most accurate indication of the “true” value of the patent. The court 
should have admitted the BenQ license and excluded the others, or at least 
afforded them little weight. More generally, courts’ approach to using 
existing licenses to determine patent damages at trial is both incoherent and 
backwards—a rare combination. Courts misunderstand patent licenses at 
their foundation and in so doing have devised doctrines that are not merely 
misguided, but counterproductive. The next Part explains how courts have 
gone astray, and the final Part investigates what might be done to correct 
them. 
  
 
II. THREE BARRIERS TO USING EXISTING LICENSES 
 
A. Existing Licenses and Private Information 
 
No one would ever license a patent absent the threat of litigation. If 
a patent holder could not threaten to enforce its patent against a putative 
                                                     
60 Id. at 58. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 78. 
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licensee in court, the licensee would have no reason to negotiate a license in 
the first place.64 Patent licenses are best understood as civil settlements in 
anticipation of possible litigation.65 
 Accordingly, the licensing fee for a given patent will depend upon 
the parties’ expected outcomes at trial.66 That is not to say that licensing 
amounts are driven only by expected trial outcomes. The cost of going to 
trial will factor into the parties’ calculations as well, and thus in some cases 
patent holders may be able to obtain licensing fees greater than the expected 
outcome at trial.67 But expected trial outcomes will necessarily play a 
significant role. To win at trial, the plaintiff has to show both that the patent 
is valid and that the defendant infringed the patent. Thus the set of potential 
trial outcomes includes the possibility that the patent will be found invalid, 
or that the court will find that the defendant did not infringe the patent, and 
thus that there will be no award of damages.68 In formal terms, the 
plaintiff’s expected outcome at trial is p × d – c, where p is the probability 
that the patent will be held valid and enforced, d is the likely amount of 
damages the court will assess, and c is the cost of litigation. Conversely, the 
defendant’s expected payout is p × d + c. The plaintiff will be willing to 
grant a license—that is, settle—for any amount greater than p × d – c, while 
the defendant will be willing to purchase a license for any amount less than 
p × d + c. Accordingly, if the two parties are able to agree upon a license, it 
                                                     
64 Keele, supra note 11, at 205 (“Royalties are usually paid to avoid litigation--most people 
who thought that they could infringe a patent with impunity would likely do so.”); Dov 
Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole 
System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 311, 388 (2009) (“…with no potential enforcement by the owner of the IP, 
potential licensees may see no incentive to ever license the patent; infringing at will.”); 
Brian Fung, The Man Who Invented Priceline.com Wants to Shake Up America’s Approach 
to Patents, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 2, 2015, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/01/02/the-man-who-invented-
priceline-com-wants-to-shake-up-americas-patents/ (“I learned very quickly that nobody 
wanted to license my solutions unless I threatened to sue them—and in most cases, when I 
actually sued them . . . .”). 
65 See infra Part II.B (explaining that there is no reason to license a patent other than to 
avoid litigation); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1992, 1993 (2007) (analyzing licenses as litigation settlements). 
66 Keele, supra note 11, at 205–06. 
67 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 2000–09 (analyzing mechanisms that can drive 
licensing prices upward). 
68 Id. (“Like any other settlement, the amount a party is willing to pay or accept for a 
litigation license . . . generally consists of three core components: the likelihood of liability 
. . . ; the expectation value of the damages . . . ; and the party's expected litigation costs . . . 
.”). 
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will be for a royalty R such that p × d – c < R < p × d + c.69 The midpoint of 
that range is p × d, and thus the parties should be expected to agree upon a 
royalty in the vicinity of p × d: R ≈ p × d. 
 By way of example, imagine that a patent holder (P) and a putative 
licensee (L1) are negotiating a license over a particular piece of patented 
technology. Suppose the parties recognize that a court is only 25% likely to 
hold the patent valid and infringed by L1. Suppose further that the parties 
agree that if the patent is found valid and infringed, the court is likely to 
assess $20 million in reasonable royalty damages. Finally, suppose that the 
patent litigation will cost each party $2 million. The patent holder’s 
expected outcome from trial is $20 million × 25% – $2 million = $3 million. 
The putative licensee’s expected trial outcome is –$20 million × 25% – $2 
million = –$7 million. P would be willing to grant a license for any amount 
greater than $3 million; L1 would be willing to pay anything less than $7 
million. The parties should be expected to negotiate a reasonable royalty 
near the midpoint of those two figures: approximately $5 million.70 The 
license that the parties eventually negotiate will be driven by the expected 
damages at trial as well as the likelihood that the patent will be found valid 
and infringed in the first instance.71 
 Now imagine that P sues a second putative infringer (or licensee) L2 
for infringing the same patent. The case goes to trial, and P wins: the court 
holds that the patent is valid and has been infringed by L2. In order to 
determine damages, the court is expected to assess the outcome of a 
hypothetical negotiation between P and L2 in which the parties agree upon a 
reasonable royalty. Under governing Federal Circuit law, the court must 
assume that this hypothetical negotiation took place immediately before the 
moment of infringement—before L2 began its infringing activities.72 
Critically, however, the court must also assume that the patent is valid and 
infringed and that both parties know it to be valid and infringed.73 In that 
sense, the trial has officially resolved any ambiguity or uncertainty that 
                                                     
69 Landes, supra note 27, at 67 (analyzing a model of settlement in which litigation costs 
create bargaining space within which parties can settle); Posner, supra note 27, at 414 
(same). 
70 Posner, supra note 27, at 414 (analyzing this dynamic). 
71 See Taylor, supra note 11, at 115 (“Negotiated royalties thus include discounts based on 
risk borne by the patent owner associated with proving liability, relief, and enforceability . . 
. .”). 
72 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach, 
attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have agreed had they 
successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began.”). 
73 Id. at 1325 (“The hypothetical negotiation also assumes that the asserted patent claims 
are valid and infringed.”); see also LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer, 694 F.3d 51, 77 
(2012) (“. . . validity and infringement of the patent not being disputed.”). 
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previously surrounded the patent. As a matter of law, P has prevailed over 
L2, with all of the attendant consequences.74 
The court is thus faced with the task of reconstructing the price that 
L2 would have paid to license the patent from P if both parties had agreed 
that the patent was valid and infringed. It is natural for a court to look to the 
existing license between P and L1 for guidance. But when that license was 
negotiated, the parties could not have been certain that the patent was valid 
and infringed—or, at minimum, there is no way for a court to know whether 
P and L1 believed that the patent was valid and infringed and no reason to 
believe that they viewed it as a certainty. That is private information, 
inaccessible to the court. P and L1 might have believed that it was 100% 
likely or nearly 100% likely that the patent was valid and infringed; or they 
might have believed it to be 50% likely, or 25% likely, as in this 
hypothetical.   
Accordingly, the court should not simply use the licensing figure 
from the agreement between P and L1—$5 million—when calculating 
damages in the P v. L2 litigation.  The parties negotiated the $5 million 
royalty with the understanding that there was some (likely non-zero) 
probability that the patent would not be found valid and infringed. Now that 
P has prevailed in its suit against L2, that probabilistic inquiry has been 
resolved in favor of P, and the court is expected to assess damages as if the 
parties were negotiating under the belief that the patent was valid and 
infringed. If the court is to use the license between P and L1 as evidence of 
damages in the litigation against L2, it must determine the fee P and L1 
would have agreed upon had they believed that the patent was 100% likely 
to be valid and infringed. 
But the court cannot determine this hypothetical licensing fee 
without knowing what P and L1 believed were their probabilities of success 
at trial. That is, the court is attempting to determine d—the parties’ view of 
                                                     
74 Most scholars and practitioners of patent law understand that patents are probabilistic 
entities through and through. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005) (summarizing and analyzing this mode of thinking about patents). 
Patents that are valid with 100% certainty or infringed by a given technology with 100% 
certainty are like the Loch Ness Monster: various people claim to have seen them, but most 
informed parties realize that they cannot possibly exist. Most patent scholars would say the 
same thing about even patents that have been adjudicated. Just because one court (or jury) 
has found a patent valid and infringed is not a necessary guarantee that a different court or 
jury would have reached the same result. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? 
An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 223 (2008) (demonstrating that even very experienced trial courts have their patent 
decisions overruled at a high rate). Nonetheless, it is inherent to a court’s self-image and 
the very nature of a trial that the law would view the decision of a court as final and 
determinative—at least with respect to the parties and issues involved in that case—and 
would treat it as eliminating any ambiguity accompanying the legal questions presented. 
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what damages a court would assess if the patent were found valid and 
infringed—by observing R, the actual royalty that the parties negotiated. 
But d is not the same as R; the negotiated royalty R would normally be 
approximately p × d, where p is the probability that the patent will be found 
valid and infringed. By simple rearrangement, d ≈ R / p. That is to say, a 
court cannot use an existing royalty (R) to determine what damages it 
should assess (d) without knowing p, the probability of success that the 
parties assigned to the patent.75 And there is almost no way for the court to 
reliably determine p, absent unusual circumstances (to be discussed later). 
The expected probability of success on the merits, p, is the parties’ private 
information, unknowable to the court. There is no way for the court to 
determine what probabilities P and L1 assigned to the patent litigation 
merely from scrutinizing the licensing agreement. The court can hardly 
force representatives of the two sides to testify to their internal perceptions 
of the patent at the time of the settlement.76 And without that information 
the court cannot use the existing license to reliably estimate the value of the 
patent. All it can know is that P and L1 valued the patent—if valid and 
infringed—at no less than $5 million. The existing license thus provides a 
floor for valuing the patent, not a reasonable estimate. 
It is easy to see that the court would err if it simply assessed 
damages against L2 equal to the amount of the prior license—here, $5 
million.77 Consider, for example, a subsequent putative infringer, L3, who is 
accused of infringement by P. L3 would understand that if it chose to litigate 
against P and lost, it would likely face damages of $5 million—the amount 
of the licensing agreement between P and L1. Outside of litigation, it would 
be willing to pay P a royalty equal to $5 million, discounted by the 
probability that P will win at trial. Imagine that P’s probability of success in 
                                                     
75 Of course, it is entirely possible that the two parties involved in a license—P and L1—did 
not actually agree on the probability that the patent was valid and infringed. P might have 
thought that the patent was 50% likely to be valid and infringed and believed that a court 
would award it $10 million if it prevailed at trial, while L1 might have believed that the 
patent was only 25% likely to be valid and infringed but anticipated a $20 million verdict if 
P prevailed. The two parties would have arrived at the same licensing figure through 
different routes. (If they arrive at different licensing figures, with P’s substantially higher, 
then they will not be able to negotiate a license and will end up in litigation.) 
 If this is the case, then the existing license is an even less valuable guide to the 
damages calculation. Instead of it being difficult or impossible for the court to determine 
the parties’ joint belief about the proper amount of damages, there is no joint belief. The 
court might as well ignore the license. In this respect, the analysis that follows stacks the 
deck in favor of using existing licenses to assess patent damages. If this analysis 
nonetheless compels the conclusion that existing licenses are not reliable guides to patent 
damages, it will not be for lack of having granted those licenses the benefit of the doubt. 
76 This point is developed further in infra Part III.B. 
77 Contra Cotter, supra note 45, at 752-53 (2011) (arguing precisely the opposite). 
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a suit against L3 is still only 25%. (The litigation between P and L2 might 
have established that the patent is almost certainly valid, but L3’s product 
might not infringe.78) In this case, L3’s expected outcome, should it go to 
trial, is only $5 million × 25% = $1.25 million. P and L3 will likely settle for 
approximately that amount. This stands in stark contrast to the $5 million 
license that P negotiated with L1. The only thing that has changed to drive 
down the licensing price of the patent is the court’s misinterpretation of the 
licensing agreement between P and L1.79 
Stated more formally, P and L1 negotiated a royalty R where R ≈ d × 
p. Then, the court in P v. L2 litigation erred by awarding damages in the 
amount of R, rather than attempting to determine d. Now, L3 recognizes that 
if it loses at trial, it will only be forced to pay d × p. Accordingly, it is only 
willing to settle for (d × p) × p, or d × p2. The court’s failure to understand 
that prior licenses are discounted by the probability of success at trial, and 
its use of such licenses as guidelines for subsequent damages awards, 
artificially reduces the value of the patent and the royalties that patent 
holders will receive.80 
 
B. Circularity 
 
The preceding analysis should make clear that the use of past 
licenses to determine patent damages is plagued by a fundamental problem 
of circularity. Licenses are necessarily negotiated in the shadow of trial: the 
royalty depends upon the parties’ expected outcomes at trial.81 When courts 
use existing licenses to determine damages at trial, the tiger is chasing its 
                                                     
78 The fact that a patent has been judged valid in one trial does not necessarily mean that it 
must or will be judged valid in another. Under the doctrine of non-mutual collateral 
estoppel, a patent plaintiff’s judgment against one party is not binding against a different 
party who was not involved in the initial case. Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 
F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Holding that an earlier determination of patent validity had 
no stare decisis effect); Timothy Denny Greene, ‘All Substantial Rights’: Towards Sensible 
Patent Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 14-19 (2012). However, the initial validity 
judgment is still persuasive precedent, and so as a practical matter a patent that has once 
been found valid is likely to be found valid again. Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 
919 F.2d 720, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The fact that the validity of those claims has 
previously been upheld in an earlier litigation is also to be given weight, though not stare 
decisis effect.”). 
79 See Cotter, supra note 45, at 732. 
80 See, e.g., VirnetX v. Cisco Sys, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (making 
this error); Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1255(Fed. Cir. 2013)  
(same); LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 66 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(same); Finjan, Inc., v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(same); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys. Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same). 
81 Id. at 2021 (discussing the effects of bargaining in the shadow of trial on licensing 
behavior). 
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own tail. Trial outcomes cannot depend on licenses if licenses depend on 
trial outcomes. 
Treating an existing licensing agreement as if it represents a true 
valuation of a valid and infringed patent will force the patent into an 
artificial downward spiral in value. A license will drive expected trial 
outcomes lower, which will in turn drive future licenses lower, which will 
in turn drive future expected trial outcomes even lower, and so forth. This 
type of positive feedback loop is unsustainable and will lead to ever greater 
distortions. 
This spiral will result even if the patent is never litigated. It relies 
only on parties correctly understanding how a court will behave and how it 
will treat existing licenses. Consider the previous example, in which L1 
agrees to license P’s patent for $5 million, with both parties calculating that 
P is approximately 25% likely to succeed at trial and the court likely to 
award $20 million in damages if P prevails. Suppose that P now approaches 
L2 and threatens litigation if L2 does not agree to license the patent. If both P 
and L2 understand that the court will use the licensing agreement between P 
and L1 to set damages in the trial, then the two parties will recognize that L2 
faces only $5 million in potential liability if it goes to trial. Accordingly, if 
P is 25% likely to prevail at trial, L2 will agree to license the patent for 
approximately $1.25 million. 
Now suppose that P approaches L3 and again threatens litigation if 
L3 does not agree to license the patent. What royalty can they be expected to 
negotiate? There are now two existing licenses: the $5 million license 
between P and L1 and the $1.25 million license between P and L2. Suppose 
that L3, like L2 and L1, is 25% likely to be held liable for infringement in the 
event of a trial. What liability would L3 face? If the court were (incorrectly) 
treating existing licenses as indicative of a patent’s value, it would likely 
assess damages in an amount between $1.25 million (the less expensive 
license) and $5 million (the more expensive license). The midpoint of that 
range—$3.125 million—is a reasonable estimate. If P and L3 understand 
this fact, then they would likely negotiate a license for approximately 25% 
of $3.125 million, or approximately $780,000.82 As P negotiates with L1, 
L2, and L3, the value of the patent has decreased from $5 million to $1.25 
million to $780,000, all without the patent ever seeing the inside of a 
courtroom.83 The downward spiral is driven entirely by the parties’ belief 
                                                     
82 $781,250, to be exact. 
83 These numbers are of course merely hypothetical; the precise metes and bounds of this 
downward spiral will depend on the values at issue in any given case. The more general 
point is that this decay in value will occur in any case in which the patent owner is less 
than 100% certain to prevail. In practice, that means that it will occur in every case; no 
patent owner can ever be completely assured of victory. 
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that the court will improperly rely upon prior licenses as evidence of the 
patent’s value.84 
As much as courts would like to rely upon market measures in 
estimating damages, there is no reliable route out of this circularity.85 The 
reason is that patent licensing fees can only ever be grounded in a threat of 
suit, and thus in the parties’ best estimate of what a court will force them to 
pay.86 There is simply no reason to license a patent other than to alleviate 
the threat of suit. It is not as if any technology is actually being transferred 
when a patent is licensed; the public patent document already discloses the 
technology on its face, and a putative licensee can read the patent without 
licensing it.87 It is of course possible that the patent holder would transfer 
technical knowledge along with a license for the patent,88 and this latent 
knowledge may well be more valuable than any technical information 
disclosed by the patent itself.89 But this transfer amounts to a provision of 
valuable information and services above and beyond a license for the patent 
itself. Courts have regularly refused to use licenses that involve a transfer of 
                                                     
84 Of course, some scholars have theorized that licensing fees are already too high, driven 
upward by the patent owner’s ability to obtain an injunction or courts’ own 
miscalculations. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 2019 (analyzing various 
dynamics that can lead to excessive licensing royalties and patent damages). Some might 
suggest that the downward spiral caused by misuse of existing licenses is a necessary 
corrective to this trend. This is not impossible, but it is highly unlikely. If the two effects 
balance one another, it would be through sheer fortuity. No sound long-term legal regime 
should rely on courts making two types of legal mistake, and hoping that each mistake 
counteracts the other. It is far better to attempt to correct both mistakes. Here, that means 
grappling with the problems of private information and circularity endemic to existing 
licenses. 
85 Contra Taylor, supra note 11, at 142–43 (suggesting that making certain assumptions 
about infringement and validity offer a “partial solution” to this circularity). As this section 
and the sections that follow will explain, there is no egress from this circularity. Indeed, it 
is the circularity that renders insurmountable the problems created when courts base patent 
damages on existing licenses. 
86 See Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting 
Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. Econ. 199, 200 (2001). 
87 See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Does Patent Licensing Mean Innovation?, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2565292 (unpublished manuscript 
2015) (surveying parties involved in patent licensing and finding that licenses rarely 
involve the transfer of technical information). 
88 See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503 (2012) 
(describing the transfer of tacit information that often accompanies patents). 
89 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 532 (2012) (surveying scientists on their use of the information disclosed in 
patents and finding that patents are less-than-perfect disclosure devices). 
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more than just patent rights as a guide to patent damages in litigation.90 This 
is appropriate; if a patent licensing agreement simultaneously involves the 
transfer of what amounts to a valuable trade secret, it cannot serve as a 
reliable guide to pricing a patent license that involves no such transfer.91  
The point is that patent licenses are inherently parasitic on litigation: 
without the threat of litigation, there would be no licensing. This is why it is 
incoherent for courts to refuse to consider licenses negotiated during 
litigation or the threat of litigation. Whether the courts realize it or not, there 
is no other context in which licenses might arise. If licenses are parasitic 
upon litigation, litigation cannot also rely upon licenses for guidance. At the 
heart of judicial practice lies a conceptual impossibility. 
What, then, is the “true” value of a patent? The problem, as I have 
argued, is that there is no inherent value to the patent—it is worth only what 
a court will force a party to pay. One possible way out of this quagmire is 
that a patent is worth whatever price the parties would bargain to if the 
court found the patent valid and infringed and awarded an injunction to the 
patent holder. But this answer is both unhelpful in practice and untrue in 
theory. As a theoretical matter, the prices that defendants pay to lift 
injunctions often reflect holdup costs, assuming the defendants have already 
invested in producing the infringing good.92 These holdup costs are an 
artifact of the plaintiff having the defendant over a barrel, not a true 
measure of what the defendant would have paid before the infringement 
began. And in practice, injunctions are sufficiently rare that it is unlikely 
that a court will any to use as a model. What are the odds that a particular 
patent plaintiff would have previously won a verdict against another 
defendant, been granted an injunction, and then licensed the patent to the 
                                                     
90 ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 870 (“Dr. David based his damages on seven ResQNet 
licenses, five of which had no relation to the claimed invention. These five re-branding or 
re-bundling licenses . . . furnished finished software products and source code, as well as 
services such as training, maintenance, marketing, and upgrades, to other software 
companies in exchange for ongoing revenue-based royalties.”). 
91 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“Damages experts cannot use noncomparable licenses, with little relationship to the 
claimed invention or parties-in-suit, as a basis for calculating reasonable royalties.”); 
Axcess Int'l, Inc. v. Savi Technologies, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-1033-F, 2013 WL 6839112, at 
*8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2013) (“With regard to the non-comparable licensing agreements 
analyzed by Dr. Hakala, the Court is of the opinion that they provide no assistance to his 
analysis. The Federal Circuit has made clear that ‘[a]ny evidence unrelated to the claimed 
invention does not support compensation for infringement but punishes beyond the reach of 
the statute.’ ResQNet.com, Inc., 594 F.3d 869. Therefore, such analysis fails to ‘carefully 
tie proof of damages to the claimed invention's footprint in the market place.’”). 
92 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 2019 (analyzing various dynamics that can lead to 
excessive licensing royalties and patent damages). 
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defendant? Given the turn against injunctions—the point with which this 
article begins—this circumstances must be very uncommon. 
Accordingly, it makes sense to think of a patent’s value as whatever 
a court would force a defendant to pay, absent any consideration of existing 
licenses. That is to say, it is whatever figure a court would arrive at after 
using the Georgia-Pacific factors other than the factors that direct a court to 
consider existing license.  These factors include “the nature and scope of the 
license,” the “established profitability of the products,” the “utility and 
advantages of [the patent] over old modes and devices,” “the extent to 
which the infringer has made use of the invention and the value of such 
use,” and so forth.93 If courts rely upon these economic factors, and 
licensing fees are based upon these court decisions, there is no circularity. 
This is the only coherent and practical way to conceptualize the value of a 
patent. The problem is that it is difficult for courts to estimate these 
values—hence the desire for market measures in the first place. 
Of course, the problem of circularity is not unique to patent law. At 
a deep level, the value of goods and legal rights in the marketplace will 
always depend to at least some degree on predicted outcomes in court. 
Whenever a court uses a market transaction to value a good or a legal right, 
the potential for circularity exists. This is most evident in negotiations over 
a surplus, where there is no clear right or wrong answer. For instance, a 
union and an employer bargaining over wages will sometimes agree to 
submit the dispute to arbitration. In reaching a decision, the arbitrator will 
look to agreements that similarly situated parties have reached in the past. 
Those past agreements, in turn, will depend to at least some degree on what 
the parties would have expected an arbitrator to decide. Private contracts 
and arbitration decisions are locked in a circle.94  (Other legal issues, such 
as the standard of care in tort law, can similarly give rise to circularities.  If 
the standard of care depends on standard industry practices, and standard 
industry practices depend on the level of care a court deems necessary, the 
same type of circularity arises.) 
In most cases, however, the influence of judicial decisions on 
market values is very slight. Imagine a situation in which A steals B’s 
bicycle and B sues A for compensation. If a court finds for B, it will 
presumably look to the market price of the bicycle to determine the 
appropriate compensation. At some very deep level, that market price could 
                                                     
93 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. At 1119-20. 
94 This can occur in other contractual contexts as well.  See Jim Leitzel, Damage Measures 
and Incomplete Contracts, 20 RAND J. Econ. 92 (1989) (suggesting that courts can create 
a circularity if they use typical private reliance as a measure of reasonable reliance 
damages, which in turn will influence the degree to which parties are willing to rely upon 
promises). 
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depend on a judicial decision. A putative bicycle purchaser might instead 
consider stealing the bicycle and taking his chances in court. In reality, 
though, bicycle ownership rights are backed by threat of injunction, or jail 
time, or reputational sanctions, or any number of other factors beyond the 
price a thief will be forced to pay. There is no real circularity. 
Although the problem of circularity in valuation is not unique to 
patent law, it is especially stark and critical in that context. Unlike most 
other goods, the value of a patent depends entirely on its likely fate in court. 
Courts, for their part, have emphasized their desire to rely upon existing 
licenses to value patents whenever possible. The circularity problem thus 
squarely infects a broad swath of patent cases. 
 
C. Contracts with Third-Party Effects 
 
The use of existing licensing agreements to determine patent 
damages raises another problem common to a wide variety of contracts that 
affect the rights and duties of third parties: it creates incentives to 
manipulate the value of the contract. Judicial use of licenses in valuing 
patents rests on the notion that the patent is being negotiated at arm’s length 
between two parties who are dividing a joint surplus.95 That is, neither party 
has any incentive to give the other side any consideration beyond what it is 
due in the course of the negotiation.96 In other words, for a license to be 
reliable evidence, a court must believe that the parties are operating in good 
faith and at arm’s length to value the patent. The reliability of the license 
depends on the presumed behavior of the parties. 
But in many contractual settings, including many patent licenses, the 
two parties to the contract are not the only ones whose rights or interests 
may be at issue. There is of course a well-known literature in the law of 
                                                     
95 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 
1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Damages for patent infringement based on hypothetical 
negotiation for reasonable royalty seeks to determine the terms of the license agreement the 
parties would have reached had they negotiated at arms length when infringement began.”); 
Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 (“Two alternative categories of infringement compensation are 
the patentee's lost profits and the reasonable royalty he would have received through arms-
length bargaining.”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting 
Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1147 
(2013) (“Under patent law, a reasonable royalty normally is based on a hypothetical, arms-
length negotiation between a willing buyer and a willing seller that takes place at the time 
the infringement begins.”). 
96 This is also true as a general matter. Courts typically use recent sales, negotiated at arm’s 
length, as an indication of fair market value, absent some reason to believe otherwise. See, 
e.g., Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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contracts on third-party beneficiaries to contracts.97 But the issue of third 
parties arises with special force when a contract between A and B affects 
how a court will value some property or service in future litigation between 
A and a third party, C. For instance, imagine a contract between an 
automobile owner A and insurer B. A contracts with B to insure A’s 
automobile in the amount of $10,000 and pays a premium based upon that 
amount. Under normal circumstances, A has no reason to insure the 
automobile for more than it is worth (unless A plans to commit fraud).98 The 
greater A’s insured amount, the higher the premium that A must pay.99 A 
has no reason to pay a premium to purchase insurance greater than the 
amount of loss that A will actually suffer.100 
Now suppose that A has reason to believe that A is likely to be 
involved in an automobile accident in which the other driver is at fault. 
(Perhaps A drives a substantial distance each day and has noticed a 
significant number of reckless drivers along the route.) If A’s automobile is 
wrecked in an accident with a third-party driver C, and C is at fault, C will 
be liable to A for the value of the automobile.101 A court might attempt to 
assess that value independently, by scrutinizing the make, model, year and 
                                                     
97 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37 (4th ed. 2010); 9-43 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 43 
(2014); HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 20 (2014); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1359 (1992); Robert S. 
Adelson, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of One 
Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875 (1985);.Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the 
Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985).  
98 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
511, 523 (2006) (explaining that there is no reason to expend resources beyond the point at 
which marginal costs exceed marginal benefits, and thus beyond the point at which there 
would be insurance for more than the value of a loss). 
99 Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law-A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 58 
(2012); see also Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: 
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1917 n.27 (1995) 
(explaining the manner in which premiums are typically calculated). 
100 Of course, generally speaking an insurance company will not sell insurance worth more 
than the replacement cost of property for fear of moral hazard. The concern is that the 
insured will take less care now that she is insured—for instance, driving more recklessly—
particularly if she is insured for more than the value of the property. However, an insurance 
company may not know the insured’s subjective valuation of the property. The insurer also 
may not have information regarding defects to the property that lower its value. So it is 
entirely possible that an insured party could end up with insurance greater than the value of 
the property being insured. 
101 Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption of 
Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007); Christopher Curran, The Spread of 
the Comparative Negligence Rule in the United States, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 317, 322 
(1992) (“While there are exceptions to the rule, in general, under comparative negligence 
the courts use the degree of negligence of the parties to an accident to determine the 
percentage of the costs of the accidents each party will pay.”). 
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prior condition of the automobile, but that task could be complicated 
because the automobile is now in pieces. Alternatively, the court might 
attempt to value the automobile by looking to the value of the insurance 
agreement between A and B. 
This creates an incentive for A to insure the automobile for more 
than it is worth. If the automobile is worth only $8000 to A, but the court 
assigns it a value of $10,000 because A has contracted for insurance in that 
amount, A will pocket a profit of $2000 after C totals A’s car. Accordingly, 
depending upon the additional premium that A must pay to insure the 
automobile for $10,000 rather than $8000, and depending upon A’s 
perception of the probability that the automobile will be damaged by a third 
party, A may have an entirely rational reason for insuring the automobile for 
more than it is worth.102 In essence, A can use the contract with B (the 
insurer) to artificially inflate the perceived value of the automobile, 
anticipating that a third party (C) will later be forced to make a payment 
based upon that inflated value. 
The litigation related to the attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001, offers an example of how these incentives might 
operate.103 In July of 2001, a real estate developer (World Trade Center 
Properties, or “WTCP”) leased the Trade Center from its owner, the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, for approximately $2.8 billion.104 
When the towers were brought down by terrorists using airplanes as 
weapons, WTCP sued the airlines for negligence, arguing that the terrorists 
would not have been able to take control of the airplanes had the airlines 
taken reasonable care in securing them against hijackers.105  The court held 
that the fair measure of the Trade Center’s market value was the lease that 
WTCP had just signed with the Port Authority—$2.8 billion.106 As the 
Trade Center’s replacement cost was much higher, this was the full 
recovery to which the WTCP would be entitled.107 Here, as in the 
hypothetical example above, the court relied upon the arm’s length bargain 
                                                     
102 For instance, suppose that A must pay an additional $10 per year to insure the 
automobile for $10,000 instead of $8000, but A believes there is a 1% chance that she will 
be in an accident that is the fault of the other driver. By insuring her automobile for 
$10,000 instead of $8000, A must pay an additional $10/year but stands to gain in 
expectation $2000 × 0.01 = $20/year. This creates an incentive for A to purchase more 
insurance for her car than it is worth. 
103 In re September 11th Litigation, 590 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
104 Id. at 536. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 540-44. New York law, which governed the case, provided that a tort plaintiff 
whose property was damaged was entitled to the lesser of (1) the property’s market value, 
or (2) its replacement cost. Id. at 541 (citing Hartshorn v. Chaddock, 31 N.E. 997, 998 
(1892)). 
107 Id. at 541. 
 
 
26  MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES  24-Feb-15 
between WTCP and the Port Authority to establish the market value of the 
Trade Center. As the court explained, “Generally, a recent sale price for the 
subject asset, negotiated by the parties at arm’s length, is the best evidence 
of its market value.”108 
When it signed the lease with the Port Authority, the WTCP 
undoubtedly understood that a court would look to that lease to estimate the 
value of the Trade Center if it was damaged by a tort. The WTCP thus had 
an incentive to artificially inflate the rental price. The Trade Center had 
already once been subjected to a terrorist attack, and the WTCP insured the 
buildings for over $3.5 billion against any damage, including damage from 
a terrorist act.109 Of course, it would not have made sense for the WTCP 
simply to pay a higher price for additional insurance. There was only some 
small probability that the Trade Center would be damaged by a third party 
(who could then be made to pay), and so each additional dollar that it paid 
to the Port Authority would likely lead to only a few additional cents of 
recovery.  
But the price is rarely the only term in a contract. The lease may 
have committed the Port Authority to provide related services, or financing 
for the lessor, or any number of other benefits. The WTCP thus could have 
arranged to purchase other positive terms in the lease for a higher lease 
price, figuring that it had a chance to recoup the higher price if the WTCP 
was damaged by a third party in tort. For instance, there might be some 
other contract term that the Port Authority would be willing to provide for 
$100 million and that WTCP would value at $98 million. It would be 
inefficient for the parties to agree to this term. But if the WTCP believed 
that there was a 3% chance that the Trade Center would be damaged or 
destroyed in a tortious action, then it would have an incentive to agree to the 
term because it could recoup 3% of the cost: ($100 million × 3%) + $98 
million = $101 million, which is greater than $100 million. The implication 
is that using market agreements between two parties to assess tort damages 
upon a third party can lead to inefficient behavior by the two contracting 
parties, not just the third-party tortfeasor. 
These examples may seem far-fetched in the context of automobile 
insurance, where most policies do not offer the car’s owner the opportunity 
to specify an insured amount, or the World Trade Center, where an act of 
terrorism may seem too unlikely to affect behavior.110 But its applicability 
                                                     
108 Id. at 546-47 (citing and quoting Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d 
Cir.2000)). 
109 Id. at 538-39. 
110 See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Damages for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 771, 
821-24 (1982) (suggesting that insured parties will not use insurance contracts strategically 
where the likelihood of a triggering event is low). 
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to patent law is much more straightforward. When a patent holder P agrees 
to license a patent to a licensee L1, it must anticipate that this license will be 
used to set damages in any future litigation between P and future licensees 
L2 or L3. Accordingly, P has an incentive to drive the price it sets with L1 as 
high as it possibly can. 
How would P go about this? As a first step, it might engage in hard 
bargaining, refusing to license the patent for a reasonable amount. The 
social cost is that licensing agreements might become much less common if 
patent holders refuse to license their IP for reasonable sums that 
approximate expected trial outcomes. The result could be a decrease in 
licensing and an increase in socially costly trials. 
An alternative would be for P to package a patent license with other 
valuable inducements in order to obtain a higher price. The typical patent 
license includes just two terms: a royalty payment, and a license for the 
patent for a period of years.111 Yet this need not necessarily be the case. Just 
as the WTCP might have obtained more favorable loan terms or any 
number of other contractual benefits in exchange for a higher lease price, P 
might provide subsidiary benefits—in addition to the patent license itself—
in exchange for greater royalties. P could offer to share technical 
information with L1, or make available its employees to assist L1 in utilizing 
the patented technology,112 or promise L1 a discount on future patent 
licenses, or package the patent license with a trademark license or other 
intellectual property, or any number of other inducements. Even if P is 
effectively “selling” the good or service for less than it is worth (if L1 will 
not take it for full value), the exchange is still worthwhile for P if it will 
increase the royalties it might eventually receive from L2 or L3. 
P might also negotiate a license in which it absolves L1 of 
responsibility for all past and future infringement while appearing to be 
selling a license only for a portion of that time period.113 For instance, 
suppose that L1 has sold 1 million allegedly infringing units of a product 
and intends to sell 1 million more. Imagine that P and L1 agree upon a 
royalty of $1 per unit. P could offer L1 a blanket license for a lump sum 
payment of $1.5 million, which represents a discount of $500,000 compared 
with what L1 might have expected to have paid. P could then structure the 
license so that it only references L1’s future conduct, making it appear as if 
L1 is actually paying a royalty rate of $1.50 per unit. 
                                                     
111 See Simple Patent Licenses, 3 ECKSTROM'S LICENSING - FORMS § 5:1 (“There is 
undoubtedly a large number of naked patent licenses regularly granted which are 
unaccompanied by rights to use other forms of intellectual property.”). 
112 See Lee, supra note 88, at 1505 (arguing that patent license can facilitate this type of 
knowledge transfer).  
113 See Keele, supra note 11, at 228 (describing a similar type of arrangement). 
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These concerns are not hypothetical. For instance, in Ericsson v. 
InterDigital,114 a third party (Nokia) accused InterDigital of artificially 
inflating the value of its patents in order to drive up the licensing price that 
Nokia would be required to pay.  InterDigital had agreed to license patents 
to Nokia for a price based in part on what other firms would pay 
InterDigital to license the same patents.115 InterDigital then succeeded in 
negotiating a lucrative license with Ericsson and demanded a substantial 
payment from Nokia. Nokia, in return, accused InterDigital of artificially 
inflating the value of its license with Ericsson. This example is perhaps 
more acute than the typical case in which licenses are used to compute 
damages because the price of Nokia’s license depended directly on the 
agreement between InterDigital and Ericsson. Nonetheless, the same types 
of concerns pervade both situations. 
Because of these concerns, courts generally do their best to prevent 
these types of arrangements from infecting license-based valuations. If a 
patent license includes additional benefits—above and beyond a simple 
license to the patent—courts typically refuse to treat the license as evidence 
of a reasonable royalty.116 As noted above, this is entirely appropriate in the 
context of litigation damages where the only benefit “purchased” by the 
defendant is a license to use the patent. P might still attempt to hide the 
other terms of the deal, describing the royalty rate in one document and 
leaving the other inducements for a separate document or no document at 
all.  If it were later discovered that a license relied upon by the court 
contained other, unstated terms, it might be possible to reopen the damages 
judgment based on fraud on the court. Nonetheless, it will be incumbent 
upon courts and parties to remain vigilant in policing these types of 
behaviors. As courts rely more and more upon licenses for measuring 
reasonable royalties, patent owners will have incentives to inflate licensing 
prices and then attempt to obscure or conceal that inflation by any means 
available to them. 
It is worth noting that the effects detailed in this section and in 
section II.A push in opposite directions. Because licenses are necessarily 
probabilistic calculations of expected trial outcomes—with victory for the 
patent holder uncertain—they will tend to depress damages calculations at 
trial. At the same time, patentees have an incentive to inflate the price of 
licensing agreements, even at the expense of inefficient transactions, which 
will tend to increase damages calculations at trial. It may be tempting to 
conclude that these effects will balance one another out, or at least come 
close enough to doing so that it is safe to ignore them. But this would be 
                                                     
114 418 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
115 Id. at 1220. 
116 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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error. It would be pure fortuity if the two effects negated one another, and 
there is no reason to expect that they would. Moreover, the price distortion 
from the former effect—the fact that licenses represent settlement of 
uncertain patent claims—will likely dwarf any distortion that patentees can 
introduce by inflating license prices. If a given patent is only 50% likely to 
be valid and infringed—which may if anything be an overestimate of the 
patent’s probability of success—then the licensing price for the patent will 
be discounted by 50%. It seems unlikely that a patent holder could inflate 
the licensing price of a patent through contract to the same degree. 
Nonetheless, any type of contractual manipulation is harmful both for the 
mispricing it can cause, and for the social waste and rent-seeking it 
generates. 
 
 
IV. A WAY FORWARD? 
 
The question that remains is whether there exists a solution to the 
problems described above. Is there a mechanism by which courts can render 
patent licenses a useful guide to calculating reasonable royalty damages? It 
is on this issue that courts and commentators have floundered. This Part 
takes up the challenge of finding such a solution. 
 
A. The Selection of Licenses 
 
As an initial step, courts should attempt to select those licenses that 
provide the most accurate estimate of damages. The dollar value of a license 
(roughly) represents the underlying value of the patent discounted by the 
probability that the patent will be found invalid or not infringed at trial. If 
the parties believe that there is only a 10% chance that a court will find the 
patent valid and infringed, the license value will be 10% of the patent’s 
underlying value—which is what the court is attempting to discover.117 If 
the parties believe that there is a 50% chance that a court will find the patent 
valid and infringed, then the parties will agree to license the patent for 50% 
of the patent’s underlying value. Accordingly, the most accurate gauge of a 
patent’s value will be provided by licenses negotiated by parties who agreed 
that a patent was 100% likely to be found valid and infringed. If the parties 
had no doubt as to the expected outcome at trial, then they would likely 
have negotiated a licensing amount approximately equivalent to d—the 
expected damages at trial, and the value that the court is seeking to 
discover. More generally, the greater the probability that the patent owner 
would prevail at trial (per the beliefs of the parties to a licensing 
                                                     
117 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. 
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negotiation), the closer the value of the license to the “true” value of the 
patent, and the greater the weight that license should be afforded by a court 
when assessing damages. 
In many cases, this means licenses negotiated as litigation 
settlements will be more accurate and more useful gauges of patent value 
than licenses negotiated outside of litigation. In particular, the most reliable 
indicator of value will be a license negotiated in the course of a trial that the 
patent owner was winning, or (better yet) winning handily.118 The closer the 
plaintiff is to being 100% certain of prevailing, the more accurate the value 
of the license.119 Courts should thus look for licenses that were negotiated 
under circumstances that were highly unfavorable to the defendant. If the 
defendant has received an unfavorable claim construction ruling,120 or had 
its invalidity defenses thrown out on summary judgment,121 and elects to 
settle, it is safe to assume that the plaintiff and defendant believe it is highly 
probable that the patent will be found valid and infringed—and surely more 
probable than they did before the trial started. A defendant who is losing at 
trial will often see the writing on the wall and settle the case for close to the 
patent’s full value.122 To be clear, the point is comparative: if courts must 
use existing licenses, they are better off with licenses negotiated when the 
defendant was losing at trial. 
Recall the issue in LaserDynamics, described in Part I: the parties 
introduced twenty-nine licenses into evidence, twenty-eight of which were 
for amounts of $1 million or less, and one of which—the BenQ 
settlement—was for $6 million.123 The BenQ settlement was negotiated as 
an end to a trial in which the defendant had already been repeatedly 
sanctioned, faced a stark disadvantage at trial, and was very likely to 
lose.124 The BenQ license was thus an extreme outlier—and of all the 
licenses in evidence, it was the one that most accurately captured the value 
                                                     
118 For the purposes of using a license to indicate the value of a patent, it does not matter 
why the patent owner is winning the case.  All that matters is that the parties believe it is 
very likely that the patent will be held valid and infringed.  The one exception is if the 
defendant is at risk of being forced to pay treble damages for willful infringement. See 
Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. 435, 438 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The threat of 
treble damages would distort the licensing price. 
119 See id. 
120 Claim construction is the process by which a court interprets or construes the claim 
terms in a patent. See Markman v. Westview, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (outlining the procedure 
for courts to construe claims). 
121 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (describing the various bases upon which a 
defendant might argue that a patent is invalid). 
122 See Posner, supra note 27, at 406 (analyzing bargaining dynamics within trial).  
123 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 57–58 (Fed Cir. 2012) 
124 Id. at 58 (“The district court had allotted BenQ one-third less time than Mr. Kamatani 
for voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument . . . .”).  
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of the patent. This is precisely because BenQ was so likely to lose at trial. 
Six million dollars is the amount that a defendant was willing to pay 
LaserDynamics when it seemed certain that it would lose at trial and be 
made to pay one way or another; $1 million (or less) was the amount that 
licensees were willing to pay when there was some substantial likelihood 
that they would prevail if it came to a trial. The LaserDynamics court 
should have adopted exactly the opposite posture: it should have treated the 
BenQ settlement as its guiding star and relegated the other twenty-eight 
licenses to secondary status. It is in this respect that the courts’ approach to 
using licenses to assess patent damages is not merely incoherent, but 
backwards. 
Of course, licenses negotiated as settlements to trial will not always 
provide more accurate guides than licenses negotiated outside of trial. The 
probability of prevailing at trial, even against the same patent owner, can 
differ widely from licensee to licensee. This is primarily because they may 
be selling different products with different probabilities of infringing the 
patent.125 There may be cases in which a license negotiated outside of 
litigation provides the most accurate guide to patent value because that 
licensee happens to believe it has the lowest probability of success at trial. 
But in the aggregate, the licenses that provide the most accurate indications 
of value will be those negotiated in the midst of trials that were going well 
for the plaintiffs and poorly for the defendants. 
This is why courts’ and commentators’ hostility toward litigation 
settlements as a gauge of patent damages is not just misguided but 
backward.126 In refusing to consider licenses negotiated during litigation, 
courts have ignored not merely a useful source of information, but in many 
cases the most useful source of information. Of course, that is not to say that 
licenses negotiated in litigation will necessarily be terribly useful, 
particularly when the licensee was not faring poorly. These licenses still 
represent only floors to a patent’s value, not accurate point estimates. But in 
many cases the courts will have no better options. 
 
B. An Estimated Multiplier 
 
Another solution would be for the court assessing damages to apply 
a multiplier to an existing license. If a court concludes that the parties to an 
existing license believed there was a 25% probability that the patent was 
valid and infringed, it could simply multiply the license value fourfold and 
                                                     
125 If the patent is invalid, it is invalid with respect to all potential infringers. Greene, supra 
note 78, at 5-7. But some putative infringers might make products that almost certainly 
infringe, while others might manufacture products that are highly unlikely to do so. 
126 See sources cited in supra notes 46-47. 
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assess damages in that amount.127 This solution seems promising (and 
simple) at first glance, but it runs immediately into the problem of private 
information that permeates this issue. The court needs to know how the 
parties to the license perceived the strength of the patent—what 
probabilities did they assign to validity and infringement?128 The only truly 
reliable information on this question is in the possession of the parties to the 
license themselves, and it is very unlikely that the court could ever discover 
this information. In most cases what information that exists will be 
protected by attorney-client privilege.129 If a licensing party formed a belief 
about the probability of invalidity or infringement, it likely did so in the 
context of a communication with its lawyers. Even where the relevant 
information is discoverable, there may be no written record; the court would 
need to rely upon the testimony of the parties. And of course the patent 
owner has no reason to testify honestly and nothing to prevent it from 
artificially inflating the patent’s value. 
In the alternative, a court might seek objective indications of the 
probabilities that underlay an existing license. When the parties present 
expert evidence on damages, their experts might include estimates of the ex 
ante probability that a patent would be found valid and infringed—in other 
words, the expert’s best guess as to the parties’ beliefs, at the time the 
license was negotiated, of the probability that the patent owner would 
prevail at trial.130 (Or, for that matter, the court might hire its own expert or 
special master to provide an independent evaluation of the same 
question.131) In essence, the court would be constructing a miniature trial on 
the merits of the prior license, attempting to reconstruct the terms of the 
bargain that the parties intended. Indeed, it appears that some patent 
                                                     
127 See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating 
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 643 (2010) (proposing a structured 
method by which courts might calculate patent royalty damages); Taylor, supra note 11, at 
131 (suggesting that “adjustments” be made to license values, without specifying what 
those adjustments might be); Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 11, at 797. None of these 
scholars recognizes or analyzes the advantages and problems involved in such an approach 
as detailed in this section.  
128 See supra Part II.A. 
129 See Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974) (defining and 
describing the scope of the attorney-client privilege); In re Revastigmine Patent Litigation, 
237 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); see also John Dragseth, Note, Coerced Waiver of 
the Attorney-Client Privilege for Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation, 80 MINN. L. 
REV. 167 (1995) (analyzing situations in which parties can be forced to disclose otherwise 
privileged information). 
130 Cf. Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (discussing the role that damages expert play in 
establishing reasonable royalty damages at trial). 
131 This practice is relatively rare, but it does occur on occasion. One instance was the 
Apple v. Motorola litigation before Judge Posner. See id. (discussing the court’s use of an 
independent damages expert); see also FED. R. EVID. 706.  
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damages experts have begun suggesting multipliers in their expert 
reports.132 In theory, courts could draw upon experts’ recommendations and 
attempt to calculate multipliers to license values. 
Yet there are (at least) four significant problems with this approach. 
The first is that it involves using objective information to answer a 
fundamentally subjective question. When an expert attempts to assess the 
likelihood that a patent would have been held valid and infringed in a prior 
litigation, the expert must endeavor to determine the parties’ perceptions of 
the patent’s strength at the time the license was negotiated. But there is no 
reason to believe that this expert’s guess will hit anywhere close to the 
mark. The expert might discover important prior art that the licensee could 
not find; or the expert might miss important prior art that the licensee 
possessed.133 Similarly, the expert might have at her disposal a set of 
arguments that the prior licensee did not, or lack some legal theory that the 
prior licensee viewed as critical. Using an expert to estimate a prior 
licensee’s view of its prospects at trial rests on a grand assumption: the 
expert will have access to the same evidence and the same legal arguments 
as the prior licensee. It is of course possible that this assumption will hold in 
one case or another, but there is little reason to believe that it will be 
consistently true. After all, the damages expert is operating at the end of a 
full trial on the merits, during which the parties have presumably produced 
every significant piece of evidence and argument available.134 The prior 
license might have been negotiated well before any trial, after much less 
investigation and study. 
The second problem is that the prior licensing negotiation involved 
private information that an expert in a later case cannot access.. The 
infringement issues in the instant case might differ dramatically from the 
infringement question that confronted the parties to the earlier license. The 
prior licensee (L1) might have been producing a very different product from 
                                                     
132 However, reported cases in which experts are even permitted to testify in favor of 
multipliers are few and far between. Compare Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 
No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 2417367, at *7 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2011) (allowing 
an expert to testify that an existing royalty should be tripled) with Avocent Redmond Corp. 
v. Rose Electronics, 2013 WL 1890007 (W.D. Wash.) (“This Court correctly prohibited Dr. 
Kerr from arbitrarily trebling his proffered royalty based on a generic 33% litigation 
success rate.”). 
133 Prior art is any information in the public domain that predates the patented invention. A 
patent can be invalidated as obvious or not novel on the basis of prior art. Robert Patrick 
Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 42-49 (6th 
ed. 2013). 
134 See Timothy Flynn, Jr., On "Borrowed Wits": A Proposed Rule for Attorney 
Depositions, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1956, 1962 (1993) (“The second fundamental justification 
offered for the adversary model is that its incentive structure makes it the best system for 
eliciting truth.”). 
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the product that was at issue in the current litigation between the patent 
owner (P) and the new putative infringer (L2). Moreover, with respect to the 
prior license, L1 might be in possession of critical information related to 
infringement. After all, it was L1’s product that was alleged to infringe the 
patent. L2 may have difficult accessing this private information; L1 is not a 
party to the lawsuit and can be served only with certain types of 
discovery.135 And without that information, L2’s expert can only guess at 
the probability that L1 would have been found to infringe. 
The third problem with attempting to estimate a multiplier for a 
prior license is that it forces the parties to make arguments during the 
damages phase of the trial that directly contradict the arguments they made 
during the liability phase. The defendant will argue that the court should 
apply a low multiple—perhaps a multiple of 1—to the prior license when 
calculating damages. In other words, the defendant will argue that when P 
licensed the patent to L1, it was a near-certainty that the patent was valid 
and infringed. This follows a trial in which the defendant argued precisely 
the contrary (particularly with respect to invalidity). The patent owner (P), 
for its part, would argue for a high multiple, claiming that when it 
negotiated with L1 it was doubtful that a court would find the patent valid 
and infringed. The patent owner has of course just spent the entire trial 
arguing the opposite: that the patent is obviously valid and infringed. 
Accordingly, both parties would find themselves trying to proffer 
arguments that they are likely estopped from raising due to positions they 
had taken earlier in the litigation.136 The result would be an awkward mess 
for the court. To be sure, these conflicts between the liability and damages 
phases might limit the sorts of outlandish claims the parties might try to 
make. But while that might be a good mechanism for reaching a moderate 
result, it will not necessarily lead to an accurate one.137  
Finally, even if the parties’ experts manage to produce insightful and 
accurate estimates of the licensing multiple, the court will likely misuse or 
even ignore them. Consider the point at trial at which this issue will arise. 
The judge and jury have just completed a trial in which the patent was 
found to be valid and infringed. They are now being asked to find—
                                                     
135 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (allowing depositions of nonparties) with FED. R. CIV. P. 
33, 35,  36 (barring interrogatories and other types of discovery directed at nonparties) and 
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (permitting document requests directed at nonparties only with leave of 
the court). 
136 Teledyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1990) (analyzing and describing 
judicial, equitable, and collateral estoppel). 
137 This particular problem could be avoided if the court simply appointed its own expert. 
But then the court would lose the benefit of the adversarial process and the high-powered 
incentives it creates. There is no guarantee that the court’s expert will obtain all of the most 
relevant evidence or raise the most important arguments on either side. 
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contrary to what they have just decided—that there was a significant ex ante 
probability that they would have reached the opposite decision. This is an 
implausible mental task for nearly anyone, including judges.138 People too 
often fall prey to motivated reasoning—the tendency to believe selectively 
those facts and arguments that support their prior conclusions and 
dispositions.139 Any judge or juror would be very hard-pressed to give a fair 
hearing to an expert who claims that their decision was less than 100% 
foreordained. Inevitably, then, courts and juries will consistently 
underestimate the appropriate multiplier to apply. In many cases they will 
ignore the need for a multiplier entirely. It is for this reason that no court 
has ever applied or even discussed the use of a multiplier in a published 
opinion, even though many have discussed the use of licenses to set 
reasonable royalty damages.140 
 
C. A Standard Multiplier 
 
 Instead of attempting to calculate a multiplier for any given license 
or case, courts could instead apply a standard, constant multiplier to all 
licenses across all cases. For instance, patent plaintiffs prevail in 
approximately 25% of all patent cases.141 If we assume, as a very rough cut, 
that any given patent owner has a 25% chance ex ante of prevailing against 
any given alleged infringer,142 then the appropriate multiplier is four.143 
Courts have thus far appeared resistant to using a standard multiplier, but on 
                                                     
138 Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III's Jury Trial Provision, 
Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 455 
(2012); Jon Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 653 (1999); Ziva Kunda, The Case for 
Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990). 
139 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2014); see also Eric A. Posner & Cass 
R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops (unpublished manuscript 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2553285 (discussing motivated 
reasoning in the context of institutional questions). 
140 See supra Part I. 
141 Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON LAW, (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed.) (2012). 
142 This is of course an entirely heroic assumption. It is highly possible that the probability 
of prevailing against a party that eventually agreed to license a patent diverges substantially 
from the actual probability of prevailing at trial, due to selection effects. The point is not to 
arrive at the perfect number, but just to find a rough and ready estimate that can be 
deployed across cases. As the discussion will demonstrate, there are substantial problems 
that accompany even this use of a rough number that go beyond any question of accuracy 
of what that number should precisely be. 
143 1 / 0.25 = 4. 
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the grounds that it lacks a connection to the case at bar.144 However, that is 
precisely the advantage of such an approach. The use of a standard 
multiplier would free courts and experts from the informational problems 
described above. It would also eliminate the concern that judges and juries 
would underestimate the appropriate multiplier due to motivated 
reasoning.145 
 The use of a standard multiplier would create problems, though. 
Even if the standard multiplier is correct in the aggregate, in the sense that 
the average license involves a patent that was 25% likely to be found valid 
and infringed, it will still overcompensate and undercompensate most patent 
holders. If the proper multiplier for a license is greater than four, the 
standard multiplier will undercompensate the owner of that patent if it 
prevails at trial. If the proper multiplier is less than four, the standard 
multiplier will overcompensate the patent owner. The patent owner will be 
properly compensated only in the rare case where the particular licensed 
patent was exactly 25% likely to be found valid and infringed at trial. Under 
normal circumstances, this type of systematic overcompensation and 
undercompensation would be a problem.146 After all, it is not the aggregate 
outcome that matters. If certain types of inventors are being systematically 
undercompensated, they may reduce their investments in research and 
development. And if other inventors are being systematically 
overcompensated, they might engage in socially wasteful expenditures in 
order to acquire more patents. Wastefully high levels of resources will flow 
to the types of inventions that are being overcompensated, leaving other 
types of innovation underfunded. 
 However, in this context, the overcompensation and 
undercompensation may turn out to be a feature, rather than a bug. The 
reason is that the patent owners who will be undercompensated are those 
who succeeded in licensing patents with a low probability of winning at 
trial. For instance, if a patent owner (P) and licensee (L1) agree that there is 
only a 10% chance that the patent will be found valid and infringed, they 
will discount the licensing price by a factor of 10. If P eventually prevails 
against a subsequent licensee (L2) at trial, the proper multiplier would be 10. 
A standard multiplier of 4 would undercompensate this patent holder. By 
contrast, the patent owners who will be overcompensated are those who 
licensed patents with a high probability of winning at trial. If P and L1 had 
                                                     
144 See, e.g., Avocent, 2013 WL 1890007 (prohibiting an expert from testifying in favor of 
a standard multiplier). 
145 See supra Part III.B. 
146 Cf. Anthony Niblett, Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law, 42 J. LEG. 
STUD. 303, 304-06 (2013) (explaining, in the context of judging, that two extreme judges 
will not cancel one another out but will instead likely produce extreme law). 
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agreed that the patent was 75% likely to be found valid and infringed, the 
appropriate multiplier (in the P v. L2 trial) would be 4/3 or approximately 
1.33. A multiplier of 4 would overcompensate P. 
 This means that parties with strong patents who assert good claims 
will be overcompensated, while parties with dubious patents who assert 
weak claims will be undercompensated. From a social perspective, this is 
desirable. A standard multiplier will dissuade patent owners from 
demanding licenses where they have only a weak claim to validity and 
infringement, potentially curbing some of the worst abuses perpetrated by 
so-called patent “trolls.”147 At the same time, a standard multiplier will 
reward parties with strong patents who pursue only obviously infringing 
parties. This may be unnecessary, as those types of patent owners are likely 
to be rewarded regardless, but it is probably not especially harmful.148 
Accordingly, at least at first glance, this approach has much to recommend 
it. 
 Yet there is a significant problem with using a standard multiplier. 
The problem lies with the circularity of using licenses to calculate trial 
damages and vice versa, and the positive feedback loop that it creates. 
Suppose that P is the owner of a strong patent that has never been litigated 
or licensed. P demands that L1 license the patent, and the parties agree that 
the patent is 75% likely to be found valid and infringed. The parties further 
agree that a court would likely award $10 million in damages if P prevailed. 
They agree that L1 will license the patent for $7.5 million.149 Now P 
approaches L2—who is selling a product similar to L1’s—and demands that 
L2 license the patent. The parties agree that the patent is 75% likely to be 
found valid and infringed if the case were to go to trial. But in light of the 
license between P and L1, the parties realize that if P were to prevail at trial, 
the court might well award $30 million in damages—the $7.5 million 
license between P and L1, adjusted upward by a multiple of 4.150 Facing a 
75% chance of incurring a damages verdict of $30 million, L2 will be forced 
to pay $22.5 million for a license, vastly more than L1. And then, if P were 
                                                     
147 See, e.g., T. Christian Landreth, The Fight Against “Patent Trolls:” Will State Law 
Come to the Rescue?, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 100 (2014) (describing the practice of 
sending demand letters to entities that are likely not infringing in the hope of negotiating 
small settlements). 
148 See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 637 (2013) (arguing that it makes economic sense to over-reward winning patent 
litigants in order to compensate them for the possibility that a court might have errantly 
invalidated their patents). 
149 $10 million × 0.75 = $7.5 million. 
150 More conservatively, the court might award damages in the amount of $20 million, 
which is halfway between the $10 million figure that the court might calculate with the 
help of experts, and $30 million, which the license would dictate. The effect on subsequent 
licenses would be the same; the magnitude would just be slightly smaller. 
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to demand a license from a third putative infringer L3, the upward spiral in 
value will continue. The result will be vast overcompensation of P. While 
some modest degree of overcompensation might not be problematic, an 
uncontrolled upward spiral in the value of the patent would almost surely 
lead to wasteful diversion of resources.151 
 The same sort of spiral will occur, though in the downward 
direction, with respect to weaker patents. Suppose P demands that L1 
license a patent that both parties agree is 10% likely to be found valid and 
infringed at trial. The parties further agree that a court would likely award 
$10 million in damages if P prevailed. L1 thus agrees to license the patent 
for $1 million. P then approaches a similarly situated L2, and the parties 
agree that there is a 10% probability that the patent would be found valid 
and infringed at trial. Now, however, L2 is facing potential liability of only 
$4 million if it litigates and loses at trial, because of the license between P 
and L1.152 Accordingly, L2 will be willing to license the patent for only 
$400,000. Just as the value of a strong patent will spiral upward, the value 
of a weaker patent will spiral downward. 
Put more formally, any time the standard multiplier M is greater 
than 1 / p (the inverse of the plaintiff’s probability of success at trial), it will 
create an upward spiral in value. Any time M < 1 / p, the standard multiplier 
will create a downward spiral in value. Only when M happens to be chosen 
perfectly—that is, M = 1 / p—will this spiral not develop. 
Again, in and of itself this is not necessarily a decisive problem; it 
might be appropriate to undercompensate parties who assert weaker 
patents.153 But it could create harmful incentives and lead to other types of 
wasteful behavior. For instance, if P has a weak case against L1 but knows 
that any settlement it reaches will harm it in future cases, it might choose to 
litigate rather than settle.154 This could lead to wasteful litigation 
expenditures and social costs. Alternatively, P and L1 might engage in other 
types of socially wasteful behavior in an attempt to obscure the value of the 
license or render it inapplicable to future cases. For instance, P might 
bundle the patent license with other goods that L1 neither wants nor needs, 
                                                     
151 See Malani & Masur, supra note 148, at 652 (explaining the social harm that can be 
caused by dramatic overcompensation of patent owners, even when their patents are valid 
and infringed).  
152 Again, the court might settle on a value somewhere between $4 million and $10 million. 
Regardless, the effect will be the same; only the magnitude of the effect will differ. 
153 See Malani & Masur, supra note 148, at 657 (analyzing the effects of under-
compensation on patent owners). 
154 On the other hand, P faces the risk that its patent would be invalidated at trial. But if P 
has a valid patent, and the weakness in its case is that L1 may not be infringing, then it has 
strong reasons to proceed to trial rather than allowing L1 to negotiate a license. 
 
 
17-June-15 MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES 39 
 
 
such as trademarks or tacit knowledge.155 The result would be to eliminate 
the license as a useful measure of patent value, using an inefficient and 
socially wasteful transaction.  
 The upshot is that while the static overcompensation and 
undercompensation caused by using a standard license multiple might be 
harmless or even desirable, the dynamic overcompensation and 
undercompensation that results from feedback between licensing and trial 
will be harmful. This speaks to the insuperable nature of the difficulties 
generated from the licensing-litigation circularity.156 Without some 
mechanism for breaking this circularity, dynamic under and 
overcompensation will frustrate any attempt to use licenses as a reliable 
measure of patent damages over time.157 The prospects for finding a true 
market measure of patent value do not seem promising.158 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Courts inevitably struggle to assess reasonable royalty damages, and 
it is only natural that they would turn to market-based measures such as 
existing licenses. However, courts’ attempts to use these licenses to 
determine patent damages at trial are frustrated by three problems. 
Calculating the underlying value of the patent from an existing license 
requires private information that the court cannot access; doing so involves 
                                                     
155 See Lee, supra note 88, at 1507 (describing such transfers). 
156 See supra Part II.B. 
157 It is extremely common for a patent holder to approach multiple parties sequentially and 
demand licenses. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 58 (noting that there were 29 
licenses on record). The dynamic problems caused by licensing-litigation circularity are 
likely to exist across a broad swath of the relevant patents. 
158 There are even more imaginative possibilities. One, which is suggested by recent work 
by Sarah and Michael Abramowicz, would be to force parties to negotiate each element of 
a settlement separately and sequentially, without comingling the separate issues. Sarah 
Abramowicz & Michael Abramowicz, Severing Settlements (unpublished manuscript 
2015), on file with author. In the patent context, Congress could require patent owners and 
licensees to negotiate damages and probability of infringement separately.  That is, instead 
of the two parties simply settling on a royalty, they would first negotiate the damages 
money they expect the court to assess against the defendant in the event the patent was 
found valid and infringed. They would then negotiate the probability that the patent would 
in fact be found valid and infringed at trial. The result would be a license that actually 
contained information regarding the parties’ view of the economic value of the patent. The 
problem with this arrangement is the immense incentive to cheat; both parties would 
benefit from agreeing to an inflated damages figure and a reduced probability. 
Accordingly, this proposal may not be easily imported to patent law. Nonetheless, similar 
types of revelation mechanisms could hold promise as means of placing market values on 
patents, and they are a fruitful subject for future study. 
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a circularity that is difficult to evade; and parties to a license have 
incentives to distort the value of that license in order to affect future 
proceedings. There are various correctives that a court can employ, 
including selecting the most information-rich licenses and applying a 
multiplier to license values where appropriate. But even these measures 
have limited efficacy. 
It is in the nature of legal scholarship to write comedies, rather than 
tragedies.159 Each legal problem should be accompanied by a clever (and 
preferably plausible) solution. But it does not seem that this story is meant 
to end well. Finding an accurate measure of patent damages is critical, and 
never more so than right now, as patents assume an ever more important 
role in the legal landscape and damages take center stage. But existing 
licenses cannot provide a useful guide to the value of a patent, only the bare 
minimum of a valuation floor. Courts have no choice but to muddle through 
technical analysis and expert reports per the remaining Georgia-Pacific 
factors. There is no reliable substitute, and no other way to make sense of 
the “true” value of a patent without creating a circularity. It is unfortunate 
that courts will not be able to draw upon market indications of value, but 
sometimes no guidance is better than guidance that can only lead astray. 
                                                     
159 To my knowledge, Tom Miles was the first to offer this observation. 
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